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An Optimization and Control Theoretic Approach
to Noncooperative Game Design
Tansu Alpcan, Lacra Pavel and Nem Stefanovic
Abstract—This paper investigates design of noncooperative
games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective.
Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that
the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative
games satisfies certain global objectives such as welfare maxi-
mization or achieving a certain level of quality-of-service (QoS).
The class of games considered provide a theoretical basis for
decentralized resource allocation and control problems including
network congestion control, wireless uplink power control, and
optical power control.
The game design problem is analyzed under different knowl-
edge assumptions (full versus limited information) and design
objectives (QoS versus utility maximization) for separable and
non-separable utility functions. The “price of anarchy” is shown
not to be an inherent feature of full-information games that
incorporate pricing mechanisms. Moreover, a simple linear pric-
ing is shown to be sufficient for design of Nash equilibrium
according to a chosen global objective for a fairly general class
of games. Stability properties of the game and pricing dynamics
are studied under the assumption of time-scale separation and in
two separate time-scales. Thus, sufficient conditions are derived,
which allow the designer to place the Nash equilibrium solution
or to guide the system trajectory to a desired region or point.
The obtained results are illustrated with a number of examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory has been used extensively as a quantita-
tive framework for studying communication networks and
distributed control systems among its other applications in
engineering and economics. Game theoretic models provide
not only a basis for analysis but also for design of network
protocols and decentralized control schemes [1], [2]. Despite
widespread use of (noncooperative) game theory in engineer-
ing, there is surprisingly little work on how to design games
such that their outcome satisfies certain global objectives.
While there is a general agreement on the usefulness of
game theory, the issues of price of anarchy or efficiency loss
associated with noncooperative games even under the exis-
tence of pricing mechanisms, have been the subject of many
investigations [3]–[5]. Consequently, different pricing schemes
have been proposed in the literature aiming to improve Nash
equilibrium (NE) efficiency with respect to a chosen criterion
in specific settings [2], [6]–[9]. The research community has
revisited the issue of game design again very recently [10],
[11]. These studies are limited either to special problem
formulations or adopt specific efficiency criteria such as the
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“system problem” of [12]. A related early line of work focuses
specifically on three agent (player) dynamic noncooperative
games with multi-levels of hierarchy [13], [14], where it
has been shown that the leader has an optimal incentive
policy which is linear in the partial dynamic measurement
and induces the desired behavior on the two followers. In
addition, a separate but substantial literature exists under the
umbrella of implementation theory, especially in the field of
economics, which focuses on finding fundamental bounds for
games where the outcome satisfies some given criteria [15].
These works, however, are often not algorithmic and do not
have an engineering perspective.
The main contribution of this paper is a treatment of
game design from an optimization and control theoretic per-
spective. A fairly general class of games are considered,
which have been applied to a number of settings including
network congestion control, wireless uplink power control, and
optical power control [16]–[20]. This paper -to the best of our
knowledge- constitutes one of the few efforts aiming to inves-
tigate the general problem of game design in a constructive
manner from an optimization and control theoretic perspective
While it is straightforward to optimize NE according to
some criterion under full information, the problem is much
more complicated under information and communication con-
straints. The game or system designer (Figure 1) usually does
not have full information about the system parameters such
as user preferences or utility functions. Under this kind of
information constraints, the designer either deploys additional
dynamic feedback mechanisms or requires side information
from the system depending on the specific design objectives.
An example for the former case is a dynamic pricing scheme
operating as an “outer feedback loop”. If the objective is
to achieve a social optimum (e.g. maximization of sum of
user utilities) or satisfying some quality of service (QoS)
conditions, then the designer often needs limited but accurate
(honest) information from users or the system.
It is important to note that if the users have the capability of
manipulating such side information, then the design problem
can be more involved or even ill-defined. For example, the
goal of reaching a social optimum without knowing true user
utilities but having only access to manipulated data may not
be a realistic or even feasible one [15]. Although mechanisms
such as VCG have been proposed to circumvent these issues,
the resulting schemes are often limited and demanding in terms
of communication requirements [10]. As a starting point, the
treatment in this paper is restricted to a class of games where
players do not manipulate the game by deceiving the system
designer. Such players are sometimes called “price-taking”
as opposed to manipulative or “price-anticipating”. Thus, the
utility functions are assumed here to accurately reflect player
preferences.
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Fig. 1. The rules or pricing mechanisms within a game can be set by a
“designer” to influence the outcome.
As an additional contribution, this paper analyzes dynamic
systems arising from game formulations and the general case
of non-separable player utilities. In such cases of coupled util-
ity functions, the utility of each player is affected by decisions
of other players. The control theoretic approach adopted here
based on game dynamics provides a more realistic model for
a number of applications compared to a static optimization
one. Stability properties of game and pricing dynamics are
investigated under the assumption of time-scale separation and
in two separate time-scales using Lyapunov theory and singu-
lar perturbation approach. The sufficient conditions derived,
which ensure system stability, are illustrated with examples.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next
section introduces the underlying game model and problem
formulation. Section III studies static design of games. In
Section IV, a dynamic control of games is discussed. Section V
discusses game design under incomplete information followed
by a numerical simulation in Section VI. The paper concludes
with remarks of Section VII.
II. GAME MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a generic class of N player static noncooperative
games, denoted by G0, on the action (strategy) space Ω ⊂ RN .
The actions of players, who are autonomous decision makers,
are denoted by the vector x ∈ Ω, with xi being the ith player’s
action. Furthermore, the ith player is associated with a smooth
(continuously differentiable) cost function, Ji : R × Ω → R,
Ji(αi, x), i = 1, 2, . . . , N , parametrized by a scalar “pricing”
or game parameter αi ∈ R. In some formulations, there may be
(coupled) restrictions on the domain of these parameters such
that α ∈ Ω˜ ⊂ RN . Assuming a set of sufficient conditions
for the existence of at least one Nash equilibrium (NE) are
satisfied, define a game mapping, T (an inverse game mapping
Tˆ ) that maps game parameters α to NE points (NE points to
parameters):
T : RN → Ω and Tˆ : Ω→ RN , (1)
such that
x∗ = T (α∗) and α∗ = Tˆ (x∗) (2)
for any NE point x∗ and corresponding parameter vector α∗.
Notice that the mappings T and Tˆ are highly nonlinear,
often not explicitly expressible, and may not be one-to-one
or invertible except for special cases, i.e. games with special
properties.
We now define a class of games, G1, by assuming a cost
structure of the form
Ji(αi, x) = αipi(x)− Ui(x), (3)
where αi ≥ 0 ∀i, the continuously differentiable functions
pi and Ui are convex and strictly concave with respect to xi
for any given x−i, respectively. Let in addition the strategy
space Ω to be convex, compact, and nonempty. Thus, a game
belongs to class G1, if the following assumptions are satisfied:
Assumption 1. The strategy space Ω is convex, compact, and
has a nonempty interior, Ω 6= ∅.
Assumption 2. The cost function of the ith player Ji in (3)
is twice continuously differentiable in all its arguments and
strictly convex in xi, i.e., ∂2Ji(x)/∂x2i > 0.
Then, under the Assumptions 1 and 2 the game G1 admits
a Nash equilibrium from Theorem 4.4 in [1, p.176].
Next, we consider a specific class of games, G2, as a special
case of G1 with additional conditions on the cost structure,
such that they admit a unique NE solution for each given α.
Toward this end, define the pseudo-gradient operator
∇J := [∂J1(x)/∂x1 · · ·∂JN (x)/∂xN ]
T := q(x). (4)
Subsequently, let the N ×N matrix Q(x) be the Jacobian of
q(x) with respect to x:
Q(x) :=


b1 a12 · · · a1N
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
aN1 aN2 · · · bN

 , (5)
where bi and aij are defined as bi := ∂
2Ji(x)
∂x2
i
and ai,j :=
∂2Ji(x)
∂xi∂xj
, respectively. The following assumptions have to be
satisfied in addition to Assumptions 1 and 2, in order for a
game to be in class G2:
Assumption 3. The symmetric matrix Q(x) +Q(x)T , where
Q(x) is defined in (5), is positive definite, i.e. Q(x)+Q(x)T >
0 for all x ∈ Ω.
Assumption 4. The strategy space Ω of the class of games
G2 can be described as
Ω := {x ∈ RN : hj(x) ≤ 0, j = 1, 2, . . . r}, (6)
where hj : RN → R, j = 1, 2, . . . r, hj(x) is convex in
its arguments for all j, and the set Ω is bounded and has
a nonempty interior. In addition, the derivative of at least
one of the constraints with respect to xi, {dhj(x)/dxi, j =
1, 2, . . . r}, is nonzero for i = 1, 2, . . . N , ∀x ∈ Ω.
If Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied, then the class of games G2
admits a unique Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, this unique
NE can be an inner or a boundary solution. We refer to Ap-
pendix as well as [1], [21], [22] for the details and an extensive
analysis. Notice that a large set of network games belong
to this class with notable examples of network congestion
games [2], [23], power control games in wireless networks [16]
and optical networks [19].
Assume that the utility function Ui accurately reflects the
preferences of users or players, who are autonomous (in-
dependent) decision makers. Then, the pricing function pi
and parameters α are in this setting the only tools for the
system designer to influence (optimize or control) the game
outcome in order to achieve a desired objective. This task
described in Problem 1 is similar -in spirit- to the goal of
implementation theory or mechanism design in the economics
literature [15] with the important difference of not allowing
users to knowingly manipulate the system, i.e. assuming price-
taking users only. This game design problem is illustrated in
Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Game design involves controlling the game dynamics such that the NE,
x∗ ∈ Ω is moved to a feasible desired region Ωˆ ∩ Ω or a specific optimal
point xˆ.
Problem 1. How to choose the pricing function p and param-
eters α such that the NE of games of class G1 satisfies some
desirable properties?
Two specific but common examples of such properties are
1) The NE coincides with the solution of a global opti-
mization problem, e.g. welfare maximization:
x∗ = argmax
∑
i
Ui(x) such that x ∈ Ω.1
2) The NE satisfies some system or user-dependent con-
straints such as capacity constraints, non-negativity, or
performance bounds. For example, the favorable set Ωˆ
can be defined as
Ωˆ := {x ∈ RN : xi ≥ 0 ∀i,
∑
i
xi ≤ C, si(x) ≥ s¯i ∀i},
where C is a capacity constraint, s(·) is a quality of
service (QoS) measure such as signal-to-interference
ratio (SIR), and s¯ denotes the minimum acceptable QoS
level.
An important aspect of Problem 1 is the amount of knowl-
edge available to the system designer in optimization of NE. If
there is complete knowledge of player preferences and global
system objective, then the approach to be adopted can be quite
different from the one when the designer has very limited
information. In cases when the game dynamics are very fast,
it is appropriate to focus on static optimization of the NE point.
1All summations in the paper are from 1, . . . , N unless explicitly defined.
Then, the actions of the system designer are assumed to be on
a slower time-scale than the actual game dynamics between
the players resulting in a hierarchical structure. This scenario
is discussed in the next section.
III. STATIC DESIGN OF GAMES
When the game designer has a way of estimating game
parameters, the game design can be posed as a static opti-
mization problem, especially when the game dynamics are
very fast and the actions of the system designer are on a slower
time-scale than the actual game dynamics between the players.
In contrast, Section IV presents a dynamic control approach
appropriate when the game dynamics are slow or there are
external disturbances. Then, the game is treated as a control
system that needs to be stabilized around a desired point.
When is it feasible to design a game such that the NE point
can be located by the system designer to a point or region with
desirable properties? In the point case, let target point be xˆ.
Then, the problem is to find an αˆ such that αˆ = Tˆ (xˆ), for any
desirable feasible xˆ. The following surprisingly simple result
addresses this problem for a fairly general class of games.
Theorem III.1. For games of class G2 with the cost structure
given in (3) and under complete information assumption, affine
pricing of the form, α p(·), is sufficient to locate the unique
NE point of the game to any desirable feasible point, xˆ ∈ Ω,
as long as
∂pi(xˆ)
∂xi
6= 0, ∀i.
Proof: The proof immediately follows from the first order
necessary optimality conditions of player cost optimization
problems due to the convexity of the cost structure and
uniqueness of NE.
αi
∂pi(xˆ)
∂xi
−
∂Ui(xˆ)
∂xi
= 0⇒ αˆi =
[
∂pi(xˆ)
∂xi
]−1
∂Ui(xˆ)
∂xi
∀i
for any feasible xˆ.
Remark 1. Theorem III.1 can easily be extended to the case
where users actions are on a multi-dimensional subspace if the
users utility function is separable.
Notice that even a simple linear pricing function p(xi) = xi
satisfies the conditions of the theorem and is sufficient for NE
optimization. In this case any xˆ ∈ Ω is feasible. However,
a symmetric pricing scheme, where αi = αj ∀i, j, is not
sufficient in general. As other examples, for p(xi) = exi any
xˆ is feasible, while for p(xi) = x2i any xˆ 6= 0 is feasible.
If a game admits multiple NE, e.g. games of class G1,
then reaching a single desirable point does not make much
sense. Furthermore, the problem of locating all NE points
to a desirable region can be rather complex. Such cases can
be handled either by exploiting any special structure of the
game due to its specific problem domain or using numerical
methods.
It is interesting to note that due to the form of the player cost
structure in (3), i.e. additive linear pricing, the optimization
problem of individual players in the game can be interpreted
as a variant of Legendre transform [24]. In other words, given
the other players’ actions, the utility function best response
of a player is transformed to a best response function which
takes the pricing parameter as argument.
Although tragedy of commons or price of anarchy are
unavoidable in “pure” games without any external factors,
they can be circumvented when additional mechanisms such
as “pricing” are included in the game formulation. In parallel
to some earlier results [25], Theorem III.1 clearly establishes
that “loss of efficiency” or “price of anarchy” are not an
inherent feature of a fairly general class of games with built-
in pricing systems. If there is sufficient information, then any
game of class G2 can be designed through simple (e.g. linear)
pricing mechanisms in such a way that any desirable criteria
such as welfare maximization or QoS requirements are met at
the unique NE solution.
Example 1
In order to illustrate the underlying issues in game de-
sign problems with accurate but limited information, con-
sider a noncooperative game formulation of the single-cell
spread-spectrum uplink power control problem in wireless
networks [26]. Specifically, the game is played in a single
cell with N mobiles competing for quality of service in terms
of signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) and the base station acts
as the game designer. This can be formulated as a class G2
game with the following general cost structure
Ji(αi, x) = αipi(x)− Ui(x), ∀i, (7)
where the objective is to locate the NE to a region that satisfies
some feasibility and QoS constraints. Further assume that the
utility function Ui of user i in this game is
Ui(x) = βi log(1 + si(x)),
where si(x) :=
hixi∑
j 6=i hjxj + σ
2
.
(8)
Here, s represents the SIR with hi > 0 ∀i denoting channel
gain parameters and σ2 a noise term. Then, each user i decides
on its own power level xi and is associated with the cost
function Ji in (7).
The desired region for the NE of this game could be shaped
by feasibility constraints such as positivity of user actions
(here uplink transmission power levels) and an upper-bound
on the sum of them, and/or some chosen minimum SIR levels
(assuming these are chosen such that the region is not empty).
A concrete example region Ωˆ can be defined as
Ωˆ := {x ∈ RN : xi ≥ 0, si(x) ≥ s¯i ∀i}, (9)
where s¯i are user-specific minimum SIR levels. A detailed
analysis of an example case is provided next. For a separate
but similar example of this formulation we refer to [20].
As a special case, the pricing function pi(x) is chosen next
to be linear in xi such that
Ji(αi, x) = αixi − βi log(1 + si(x)),
where si(x) is defined in (8). Under appropriate assumptions,
the game is one of class G2 and admits a unique inner NE
solution, x∗.
For notational convenience, we define the matrix
A :=


1
h2
Lh1
h3
Lh1
· · ·
hN
Lh1
h1
Lh2
1
h3
Lh2
· · ·
hN
Lh2
h1
Lh3
h2
Lh3
1 · · ·
hN
Lh3
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
h1
LhN
h2
LhN
· · ·
hN−1
LhN
1


(10)
Then, the NE is the solution of
Ax∗ = c,
where
c :=
[
β1
α1
−
σ2
Lh1
, . . . ,
βN
αN
−
σ2
LhN
]
.
The desired QoS region Ωˆ in (9) can be alternatively
described in terms of received power levels at the base stations
and in matrix form [27]:
Ωˆ = {x ∈ RN : xi ≥ 0 ∀i, Sx ≥ b},
where the matrix S is defined as
S :=


h1 −h2
s¯1
L
· · ·
−hN s¯1
L
−h1s¯2
L
h2 · · ·
−hN s¯2
L
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−h1s¯N
L
−h2s¯N
L
· · · hN


, (11)
and
b :=
[
s¯1σ
2
L
, . . . ,
s¯Nσ
2
L
]T
.
If the designer, here the base station, has full information,
then given a feasible target SIR level s¯ it is possible to solve
for a pricing vector α such that the NE is on the boundary
of Ωˆ, i.e. Sx = b. This is due to both matrices A and S
being nonsingular as hi > 0 ∀i. Hence, the appropriate pricing
vector α can be immediately obtained from the boundary
solution
c = AS−1(b),
and the definition of c.
IV. DYNAMIC CONTROL OF GAMES
Many games are solved in a distributed manner. Hence,
the convergence of the system trajectory to the equilibrium
point may not be very fast and the time-scale separation
between system designers actions and actual game dynamics
may fail. Then, the game design can be modeled as a feedback
control system which utilizes pricing as the control input
and the desired target as the reference (see Figure 3). This
formulation also brings a certain robustness with respect to
initial conditions or game (system) parameters. The latter case
is especially relevant for systems that are non-stationary over
longer time periods and can also be formulated as a tracking
Game DynamicsControl
(Pricing)
Fig. 3. Feedback control of the game (NE, x∗) using pricing α as the control
parameter and xˆ as the desired reference signal.
problem. Specific examples are congestion and power control
game formulations, [9], [16], [23].
The counterpart of the feasibility question in the case of
static game optimization relates in the dynamic control setting
to the controllability of the system shown in Figure 3, or
reachability of a state xˆ. In order to provide a concrete example
to the problem of controllability, consider a game of class G2
where the players adopt a gradient algorithm to optimize their
own cost. Then, the game dynamics are:
x˙i = −
∂Ji(x)
∂xi
=
∂Ui(x)
∂xi
−
∂pi(x)
∂xi
αi ∀i, (12)
where α acts as the feedback control on the outcome of the
game. Here, the objective is to investigate the conditions under
which the game system is controllable. We write (12) in vector
form as
x˙ = f(x) +
N∑
i=1
gi(x)αi = f(x) +G(x)α (13)
where α = [α1 . . . αN ]T , the matrix
G(x) = [g1(x), . . . , gN (x)] ,
and the vector
f(x) =
[
∂U1(x)
∂x1
. . .
∂Ui(x)
∂xi
. . .
∂UN(x)
∂xN
]T
.
Alternatively, the matrix G is given by
G(x) =


−
∂p1(x)
∂x1
. . . 0
. . . −
∂pi(x)
∂xi
. . .
0 . . . −
∂pN(x)
∂xN

 .
Based on the standard theorem on controllability using Lie
brackets [28, Chapter 1], we obtain the following result.
Theorem IV.1. For games of class G2 with cost structure (3)
and game dynamics (12), or (13), a sufficient condition for
local reachability around a point x0 is that the distribution C
satisfies the rank condition at x0, dimC(x0) = N where
C =
[
g1, . . . , gN , [gi, gj ], . . . , [f, gi], . . . , ad
k
fgi, . . .
]
where [f, gi](x) =
∂gi(x)
∂x
f(x) −
∂f(x)
∂x
gi(x) is the Lie
bracket of f and gi, and adkfgi denote higher order Lie
brackets defined recursively by adkfgi(x) = [f, adk−1f gi](x).
Remark 2. Notice that if the diagonal matrix G(x0) has rank
N , any xˆ locally around x0 is reachable in finite time under
piecewise constant input functions, which is equivalent to the
feasibility condition in Theorem III.1. In addition, for the
simple linear pricing function p(xi) = xi any xˆ is immediately
reachable since G(xˆ) is constant and invertible.
Alternatively, the problem can be posed as one of asymp-
totic set point regulation, i.e., to find a feedback control of
the form α = α(x, xˆ) such that the system trajectory x (and
eventually the NE) converges to the desired reference point
xˆ [28, Chapter 8]. Considering the game system (13) and the
change of variables x˜ = x − xˆ, in the new coordinates the
game system becomes
˙˜x = f(x˜+ xˆ) +G(x˜ + xˆ)α (14)
and the design problem is to find control α to stabilize the
equilibrium x˜ = 0. The first necessary condition, which
translates into feasibility condition for xˆ is that (14) has an
equilibrium at the origin, i.e. there exists a steady-state control
αs = c(xˆ) that solves
0 = f(xˆ) +G(xˆ) c(xˆ) (15)
The component αs is the first component in α needed to main-
tain equilibrium at the origin, while a second component is
needed to asymptotically stabilize this equilibrium in the first
approximation. Thus, based on the necessary and sufficient
conditions for asymptotic regulation problem (see Theorem
8.3.2 in [28]), specialized for constant reference, a feedback
control law for the pricing parameter that solves this problem
in the full information case is α = α(x, xˆ) with
α(x, xˆ) = c(xˆ) +K (x − xˆ) (16)
where c(xˆ) solves (15) and K selected such that (A +BK)
has eigenvalues with negative real part. The matrices A and
B denote the Jacobians of f and g at the origin, respectively.
Using (13) it can be seen that the feasibility condition (15)
is equivalent to feasibility in the static case (Theorem III.1).
Also, for G(xˆ) full rank this feasibility condition of the regu-
lation problem corresponds to xˆ being reachable (see remark
after Theorem IV.1). Note also, that for constant reference xˆ,
integral control could be included in the design formulation
by augmenting the system (13) with a stack of N integrators
σ˙ = x˜ (17)
The task is to design a stabilizing feedback controller α =
α(x˜, σ) that stabilizes the augmented state model (14,17) at
the equilibrium point (0, σs) , where σs produces the desired
steady-state control [28].
Example 2
Consider the power control problem in optical networks
[19] with linear pricing and an optical signal-to-noise ratio
(OSNR)-like utility function. Similar to the wireless case, the
players here compete for quality of service in terms of OSNR.
and are coupled due to interference. The user i chooses own
power level xi based on the following cost function
Ji(x) = αixi − βi log
(
1 + ai
γi(x)
1− Γiiγi(x)
)
(18)
a special case of (3), where βi, ai are design parameters and
γi(x) denotes the OSNR
γi(x) =
xi
n0 +
∑
j Γijxj
(19)
for a given system matrix Γ and input noise n0. Let Γ˜ be the
matrix with elements
Γ˜ij =
{
ai, i = j
Γij , i 6= j
. (20)
Then the corresponding dynamic system, similar to (13), is
x˙ = f(x)− α
where f(x) is the vector with elements
∂Ui(x)
∂xi
=
aiβi
n0 +
∑
j Γ˜ijxj
or, in shifted coordinates, x˜ = x− xˆ,
˙˜x = f(x˜+ xˆ)− α
Linearizing around the origin, x˜ = 0, yields B = −I and
A =
∂f(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=xˆ
= DΓ˜
with Γ˜ as in (20) and
D = diag
(
−aiβi
(n0 +
∑
j Γ˜ij xˆj)
2
)
.
An appropriate gain K can be selected to ensure stability
at the origin for A + BK if the feasibility conditions are
satisfied, [28], i.e., (A,B) is stabilizable and[
A B
I 0
]
=
[
DΓ˜ −I
I 0
]
is nonsingular, which is clearly the case. Thus, tracking is
achievable, and pole placement methods can be applied to
derive an exact gain parameter K . In addition, the system
can be made more robust by applying integral control as an
alternative. The same two feasibility conditions that apply to
feedforward control, which our system (A,B) already satis-
fies, also apply to integral control. The augmented linearized
system (A,B) with integral control has the form[
˙˜x
σ˙
]
=
[
DΓ˜ 0
I 0
] [
x˜
σ
]
+
[
−I
0
]
α
with control law α = Kx˜ +KIσ. The gains K and KI can
be determined using pole placement applied to the augmented
system.
V. GAME DESIGN UNDER INFORMATION CONSTRAINTS
Unlike the case discussed in the previous section, the
system designer usually does not have full information about
the system parameters such as user preferences or utility
functions. Under such information constraints, the designer
either deploys additional dynamic feedback mechanisms or
requires side information from the system, depending on the
specific design objectives. An example for the former case is
a dynamic pricing scheme operating as an “outer feedback
loop”. If the objective is to achieve a social optimum (e.g.
maximization of sum of user utilities) or satisfying some
QoS constraints, then the designer often needs accurate side
information from users or the system. Assuming that users are
non-manipulative (honest or price-taking) and given accurate
side information, the task of the designer can be formulated as
an optimization problem even if it is solved indirectly or in a
distributed manner. Next, an example formulation is provided
that illustrates the underlying concepts. The objective is let the
NE coincide with a social optimum (maximizing sum of user
utilities) in the general case of non-separable user utilities of
the form Ui(x).
A. Pricing Dynamics under Time-Scale Separation
Define a strictly concave and smooth social welfare function
U(x) which is a sum of concave and non-separable utility
functions U(x) :=
∑
i Ui(x) and admits a global maximum
xˆ = argmaxx
∑
i Ui(x). As before the cost function is
Ji(αi, x) = αipi(x) − Ui(x). Here, unlike the separable
one in [29], side information (e.g. Ui(x∗)) is required in
order to bring the NE to the social maximum point. The
social maximum is defined easily via the first order optimality
conditions
∂U
∂x
(xˆ) = 0,
where
∂U
∂x
(x) =
[ ∑
j
∂Uj
∂x1
(x) . . .
∑
j
∂Uj
∂xN
(x)
]
.
The social maximum is shown to coincide with the unique
equilibrium (and NE) of the following pricing mechanism
α˙i =
∑
j
∑
k
∂Uj
∂x∗k
∂x∗k
∂αi
∀i (21)
If these pricing dynamics are on a slower time scale than
the game dynamics, then the system designer can obtain
sufficiently accurate estimates of ∂Ui(x∗)/∂xi and ∂x∗i /∂αi.
As one possibility, if the users adopt a gradient algorithm,
then the designer can use past values of x∗ and α along
with the exact form of the pricing functions p to estimate
∂Ui(x
∗)/∂xi directly without requiring any side information
(except from some fixed system parameters). In addition, side
information (e.g. Ui(x∗)) is required to estimate ∂Ui(x∗)/∂xj
and ∂x∗i /∂αj for all i, j.
Assume an ideal case where the parameter estimation is
perfectly accurate. Then, the pricing mechanism above ensures
that the NE point of the underlying game globally asymptot-
ically converges to the maximum of the social welfare func-
tion.2 The next theorem follows from Lyapunov theory and
LaSalle’s theorem in a straightforward manner. The Lyapunov
function is chosen to be the negative of social welfare function,
V = −U .
Assume that the pricing mechanism is on a slower time
scale than the actual game dynamics leading to a time-scale
2For simplicity, the social maximum point is implicitly assumed to be on
the solution space of the game.
separation, and hence to a hierarchically structured problem.
Assuming this time-scale separation, for simplicity, initially
only the pricing dynamics (slower dynamics) is considered.
Theorem V.1. Consider a class G2 game with cost struc-
ture (3) and user utilities Ui ∀i, where the objective function
U(x) :=
∑
i Ui(x) admits a unique inner global maximum
xˆ = argmaxx U(x). Then, the pricing mechanism (21) en-
sures that the NE point of the underlying game, x∗, globally
asymptotically converges to the maximum of the social welfare
function, xˆ, if the Jacobian matrix of the mapping T with
respect to pricing vector α, defined as
H(α) :=
∂x∗
∂α
(α) =
[
∂x∗i
∂αj
(α)
]
, i, j = 1, . . . , N,
is non-singular.
Proof: The pricing dynamics (slow) are analyzed, assum-
ing that the user dynamics is fast and converges quickly to
x∗ = T (α) for any given α. The pricing scheme (21) admits a
unique equilibrium if and only if ∂U(x)/∂x = 0.3 In order to
prove this statement, first change the summation order in (21)
and write it in vector form as
α˙ = HT (α)
[
∂U
∂x
(x)
]T
(22)
where x = T (α). The sufficiency immediately follows from
non-singularity of H . If ∂U/∂x = 0, then α˙ = 0 and at the
same time the system is at the social maximum xˆ. Hence, at
the unique equilibrium of the pricing scheme, αˆ, the social
maximum is achieved. Next, the necessity is shown under the
same condition. At the unique equilibrium point αˆ of the pric-
ing scheme (22), it is necessary that ∂U/∂x = 0 due to non-
singularity of of H . Consequently, at the unique equilibrium
point αˆ of the pricing scheme the objective function U(x)
necessarily reaches its maximum xˆ characterizing the social
maximum, hence xˆ = T (αˆ) or αˆ = Tˆ (xˆ).
In order to establish convergence of (21), define the Lya-
punov function
V (α) := −U = −
∑
i
Ui(T (α))
on the compact game domain Ω and α ∈ RN . Taking
the derivative of V with respect to time along the pricing
dynamics (21) yields
V˙ = −
∑
i
∑
j
∂Ui
∂xj
∑
k
∂xj
∂αk
α˙k
= −
∑
k
(∑
i
∑
j
∂Ui
∂xj
∂xj
∂αk
)
α˙k
= −
∑
k(α˙k)
2 ≤ 0.
Thus V˙ = 0 only at α˙j = 0, ∀j, or at its unique equilibrium.
Hence, by the LaSalle’s theorem, (Theorem 4.4, [30]), the
pricing scheme (21) globally asymptotically converges to its
unique equilibrium at which the NE solution coincides with
the social maximum.
3We drop in the rest of the proof the (·)∗ notation, which characterizes the
NE, for convenience.
In the special case of separable utility functions U(x) :=∑
i Ui(xi), the pricing mechanism simplifies to
α˙i =
∑
j
∂Uj
∂x∗j
∂x∗j
∂αi
∀i, (23)
which ensures that the NE point of the underlying game
globally asymptotically converges to the maximum of the
social welfare function under the same condition.
Example 3
Consider a game with separable utility functions with the
cost
Ji(αi, x) = αi (
∑
i xi)− Ui(xi),
where Ui := βi log(1 + xi)− kixi).
This type of utility function may arise due to inherent physical
constraints on player actions such as battery constraints on
uplink transmission power levels in wireless devices. Then,
the NE solutions is
x∗i =
βi
αi + ki
− 1.
Notice that, the matrix H(α) is diagonal in this case. Further-
more, we can explicitly find
∂x∗i
∂αi
= −
βi
(αi + ki)2
< 0,
from which non-singularity of H immediately follows. The
properties of this example also hold for a quadratic pricing
function replacing the linear one, i.e., pi(x) =
∑
i x
2
i . How-
ever, for pi(x) = e
∑
i
xi
, x∗i is not independent of αj and
non-singularity of H(α) is not immediate.
Example 4
Consider a variant of Example 1 for the non-separable utility
case by defining a linear pricing and a signal-to-interference
ratio (SIR)-like utility function
Ji(αi, x) = αi
(∑
i
xi
)
− βi log(1 + si(x)),
where
si(x) :=
hixi∑
j 6=i hjxj + σ
.
Here, the parameter L = 1 for simplicity. Then, it follows
that under non-singularity conditions on the system matrix A
defined in (10), the unique NE is given as x∗ = A−1 v where
v = [vi], vi =
βi
αi
− σ. In this case x∗i depends on all pricing
parameters, α, and H(α) is not diagonal. However, we can
still explicitly find ∂x∗/∂α, and it can be shown that, under
non-singularity conditions on AT , H is non-singular.
Example 5
An example of dynamic game control is obtained by ex-
tending Example 1 to the limited information case where the
designer does not have access to user preferences. Then, a
dynamic a pricing mechanism can be deployed. Toward this
end, define a set of penalty functions ρi(xi) to bring the system
within the desired region
ρi(xi) :=
{
f(bi − (Sx)i), if si < s¯i
0, else
, (24)
where the scalar function f(·) is smooth and nondecreasing
in its argument, and
f(0) = f˙(0) = 0.
For example, f could be a quadratic function.
A possible pricing function is then
α˙i =
∑
j
∂ρj
∂x∗j
∂x∗j
∂αi
∀i. (25)
It is assumed here that the designer (base station) has access
to system parameters L, h, and σ. The other terms can be
estimated through iterative observations [31].
Finally, this pricing mechanism ensures that the NE point
of the underlying game, x∗, enters the desired QoS region Ωˆ.
To show this, define the Lyapunov function
V := −
∑
i
ρi(xi)
on the compact game domain Ω. Taking the derivative of V
with respect to time along the pricing dynamics (25) yields
V˙ = −
∑
i
∂ρi
∂xi
∑
j
∂xi
∂αj
α˙j
= −
∑
j
(∑
i
∂ρi
∂xi
∂xi
∂αj
)
α˙j
= −
∑
j(α˙j)
2 ≤ 0,
with V˙ < 0 outside the set Ωˆ and V˙ = 0 if and only if
α˙i = 0 ∀i. Hence, the system converges to the desired region
Ωˆ under the pricing mechanism.
B. Game and Pricing Dynamics on Two Time-Scales
The previous analysis has focused on pricing dynamics
under the time-scale separation, where game dynamics are
assumed to be sufficiently fast. Removing this assumption
for a complete treatment, two loops (on two time-scales)
will be considered: one outer loop for pricing (α˙i) and an
inner loop for actions (x˙i). The next result presents the full
analysis taking both user and pricing dynamics into account
and is based on a singular perturbation or boundary layer
approach, [30]. Towards this end, Theorem V.1 is extended to
analyze both pricing (slow) dynamics and user (fast) dynamics
by using a combined Lyapunov function.
Theorem V.2. Define an objective function U(x) :=∑
i Ui(x) which admits a unique inner global maximum
xˆ = argmaxx U(x) under suitable assumptions for user
utilities Ui ∀i in a class G2 game. Then, under the pricing
mechanism (21) the user dynamics (12) globally asymptoti-
cally converges to the maximum of the social welfare function,
xˆ, if the two systems are on separate time-scales, the Jacobian
matrix of the mapping T with respect to pricing vector α,
H(α) =
∂x∗
∂α
(α) =
[
∂x∗i
∂αj
(α)
]
, i, j = 1, . . . , N,
is non-singular and the Jacobian matrix Θ of ∂Ji
∂xi
, (12), with
respect to x
Θ(α, x) =
[
∂2Ji(α, x)
∂xj∂xi
]
, i, j = 1, . . . , N,
is positive definite.
Proof: Consider the pricing dynamics (21) or (22) on
the slow time-scale t, and the user dynamics (12) or (13) on
the fast time-scale, tf . Here t = ǫ tf , with ǫ > 0 a small
scaling parameter. The equilibrium of the full system (12), (22)
is described by xˆ = T (αˆ) and αˆ = Tˆ (xˆ). In singular
perturbation form the full system is written in the shifted
coordinates (α˜, x˜) as
˙˜α = HT (α˜ + αˆ)
[
∂U(x)
∂x
]T ∣∣∣∣∣
x=x˜+xˆ
ǫ ˙˜x = f(x˜+ xˆ) + g(x˜+ xˆ) (α˜+ αˆ) (26)
where x˜ = x − xˆ, α˜ = α − αˆ, ˙˜α = dα˜/dt and the origin
(α˜, x˜) = (0, 0) is its equilibrium.
In the shifted coordinates the slow manifold is defined as
x˜ = h(α˜) by taking ǫ = 0 and solving on the right-hand side
of (26), i.e.,
0 = f(x˜+ xˆ) + g(x˜+ xˆ) (α+ αˆ)
Since 0 = f(x) + g(x)α for x = T (α), the foregoing yields
x˜+ xˆ = T (α˜+ αˆ), so that x˜ = h(α˜) for h(α˜) defined by
h(α˜) := T (α˜+ αˆ)− xˆ = T (α˜+ αˆ)− T (αˆ) (27)
with h(0) = 0.
Once the slow manifold is determined, a solution that starts
in the manifold is known to stay inside for all times. In order
to analyze the behavior in the neighborhood of this manifold,
an additional change of variables is used y = x˜ − h(α˜) on
the fast dynamics x˜ with respect to the slow manifold. Using
this change of variables the full system (26) is written in the
(α˜, y) coordinates as
˙˜α = HT (α˜+ αˆ)
[
∂U(x)
∂x
]T ∣∣∣∣∣
x=y+T (α˜+αˆ)
(28)
ǫy˙ = f(y + T (α˜+ αˆ)) + g(y + T (α˜+ αˆ)) (α˜+ αˆ)
−ǫ
∂h(α˜)
∂α˜
HT (α˜+ αˆ)
[
∂U(x)
∂x
]T ∣∣∣∣∣
x=y+T (α˜+αˆ)
where y = x − xˆ − h(α˜) and (27) have been used to obtain
x = y + T (α˜ + αˆ).
On the slow manifold (for y = 0), the dynamics of α˜ in (28)
define the reduced system, i.e.,
˙˜α = HT (α˜+ αˆ)
[
∂U(x)
∂x
]T ∣∣∣∣∣
x=T (α˜+αˆ)
(29)
On the fast tf time-scale, the dynamics of y in (28) define the
boundary-layer system
dy
dtf
= f(y + T (α˜+ αˆ)) + g(y + T (α˜+ αˆ)) (α˜ + αˆ) (30)
where dy
dtf
= ǫy˙ and ǫ = 0 has been used on the right-hand
side of (28). Using (12), yields component-wise from (30)
dyi
dtf
= −
∂Ji(α˜, x)
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
x=y+T (α˜+αˆ)
(31)
To analyze the behavior and stability properties of the full
system (28), an overall composite Lyapunov function is
defined based on Lyapunov functions for the reduced (29) and
boundary-layer systems, (31), respectively. For the reduced
system (29) the same Lyapunov function is used, i.e.,
V (α˜) = −U(T (α˜ + αˆ)). (32)
As shown in the proof of Theorem V.1, the derivative of V
with respect to time along the reduced system dynamics (29)
is negative,
V˙ (α˜) ≤ −‖ ˙˜α‖2 ≤ 0 (33)
For the boundary-layer system (31) the following candidate
Lyapunov function is defined
W2(α˜, y) =
1
2
∑
i
φ2i (α˜, y + T (α˜+ αˆ)) (34)
where
φi(α˜, y + T (α˜+ αˆ)) :=
∂Ji(α˜, x)
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
x=y+T (α˜+αˆ)
Note that φi = dyidtf and, by using (31),
dφi
dtf
=
d2yi
dt2f
= −
∑
j
{
∂
∂yj
(
∂Ji(α˜, x)
∂xi
)}
φj (35)
The derivative of W2 with respect to time along the boundary-
layer system trajectory (30) is given as
dW2
dtf
(α˜, y) =
∑
i
φi(α˜, y + T (α˜ + αˆ))
dφi
dtf
.
or, by using (35),
dW2
dtf
(α˜, y) = −
∑
i
∑
j
φiΘi,jφj
where,
Θi,j :=
∂2Ji(α˜, x)
∂xj∂xi
evaluated at x = y + T (α˜+ αˆ). In vector form this yields
dW2
dtf
(α˜, y) = −φT Θφ < 0 (36)
since Θ > 0 by assumption. Moreover, for any α˜ in an
appropriate domain around 0 an upper bound that depends
only on y can be found for (36).
Finally, using the Lyapunov functions for the reduced (32)
and boundary-layer systems (34), the following candidate
Lyapunov function is defined for the full singularly perturbed
system (28)
W (α˜, y) = (1 − d)V (α˜) + dW2(α˜, y)
for some 0 < d < 1. Then based on (33, 36) using standard
arguments as in the proof of Theorem 11.3 in [30], it can be
shown that there exists an ǫ∗ > 0 such that for every 0 < ǫ <
ǫ∗, W is a Lyapunov function for the full system (28) and the
system is asymptotically stable around the origin.
Remark 3. The bound and required interconnection relations
follow immediately if, the stronger condition is imposed that
the reduced and boundary-layer systems are exponentially
stable as in Theorem 11.4 in [30].
Example 6
Consider the Example 2 with cost Ji a special case of (3),
for linear pricing and OSNR-like utility
Ui(x) = βi(log
(
1 + ai
γi(x)
1− Γiiγi(x)
)
− xi) (37)
Such an utility that may arise due to specific constraints on
individual channel power ensures the existence of a unique
maximum for U(x) =
∑
i Ui(x). The Nash equilibrium x∗
can be obtained from ∂Ji/∂xi = 0. If ai are selected such
that the following diagonal dominance condition holds
ai >
∑
j 6=i
Γij (38)
then x∗ is explicitly expressed as
x∗ = Γ˜−1 C(α)
where
Γ˜ij =
{
ai, i = j
Γij , i 6= j
,
and C(α) is a vector with elements aiβi
αi+βi
− n0. Hence,
H(α) =
∂x∗
∂α
(α) = Γ˜−1diag
(
−aiβi
(αi + βi)2
)
(39)
is clearly non-singular. The second condition in Theorem V.2
is that Θ > 0, where Θ is for this example:
Θii =
∂2Ji
∂x2i
=
a2iβi
(n0 +
∑
j Γ˜ijxj)
2
Θij =
∂2Ji
∂xj∂xi
=
aiβiΓij
(n0 +
∑
j Γ˜ijxj)
2
.
It can be immediately seen that if (38) holds, then the matrix
Θ is strictly diagonal dominant. If in addition, ai >
∑
j 6=i Γji
it can be shown that ΘT is strictly diagonal dominant, hence
Θ is positive definite. The closed loop system (21), (12) is
α˙ = HT (α)
[
∂U
∂x
(x)
]T
(40)
x˙ = f¯(x) − α (41)
where HT (α) is defined in (39), and based on (37), the jth
element in ∂U
∂x
(x), for U(x) :=
∑
i Ui(x), is given as
∂U
∂xj
(x) = f¯j(x) −Xj(x) (42)
with
f¯j(x) =
ajβj
n0 +
∑
k Γ˜jkxk
− βj
Xj(x) =
∑
p6=j
apβpΓpjxp
(n0 +
∑
k 6=p Γpkxk)(n0 + (
∑
k Γ˜pkxk)
Thus (40), (41) represent the closed-loop dynamic system. The
objective function U satisfies ∂2U/∂2x < 0 for a nonempty
set of the design variables a, β, but the conditions are very
complicated and as such the details are omitted. The following
section presents an example based on realistic parameters for
the two channel case.
VI. SIMULATIONS
The dynamic system described by (40) and (41) of Example
6 in the previous section is simulated numerically in the two
players case. Consider an optical fiber link with ten amplifiers,
each with a parabolic gain shape according to the formula
G = −4e16× (λ− 1555× 10−9)2 +15 dB, where λ denotes
a channel wavelength, and a span loss of 10 dB. The system
matrix Γ is obtained as
Γ =
[
2.47× 10−3 2.61× 10−3
2.36× 10−3 2.5× 10−3
]
The following parameters are used: βi = 1, a = [0.485, 0.48]
such that they satisfy the diagonal dominance condition on
Γ and ∂2U/∂2x < 0. These parameters yield the equilib-
rium solution xˆ = [0.0134, 0.0128] milliwatt (mW) and
αˆ = [73.4, 76.9]. An input noise power of n0 = 0.43 nanowatt
(nW) is considered. The closed-loop system (40), (41) is
simulated for ǫ = 0.01, i.e., on two time scales such that
in discrete-time form the pricing algorithm (40) is run every
100 iterations of the user algorithm (41). The user algorithm
is implemented in a decentralized way such that only the
explicitly measurable OSNR γi signal is fed back to the
respective channel source.
The simulations, which take α = [18.35 19.23] and
x = [0.00043 0.00043]T as initial conditions and run for 50
(5000) iterations of the pricing (users) algorithm, show a clear
convergence to the equilibrium solution xˆ, αˆ and to the OSNR
values of approximately 23dB in Figures 5 and6). The Figure 4
depicts the evolution of channel prices, α, as a function of
time.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Nash equilibrium design of noncooperative games is
discussed from an optimization and control theoretic perspec-
tive. It is shown that for a fairly general class of noncoopera-
tive games, pricing mechanisms can be used as a design tool
to optimize and control the outcome of the game such that
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certain predefined global objectives are satisfied. The class
of games studied are applicable to a number of problems,
such as network congestion control, wireless uplink power
control, and optical power control. The game design problem
is analyzed under full and limited information assumptions,
perfect and imperfect time-scale separation between game and
pricing dynamics, and both for separable and non-separable
utility functions. Sufficient conditions are derived, which allow
the designer to place the Nash equilibrium solution or to guide
the system trajectory to a desired region or point. The results
obtained are illustrated through a number of examples from
wireless and optical networks.
There are many directions for extending the results pre-
sented. One of them is further application of game design
methods to specific problems such as power control in optical
networks. Others include secure communication and spectrum
allocation in wireless networks. Yet another interesting direc-
tion is the analysis of estimation error effects on mechanism
stability for the limited information case. In addition, the
stability of the combined pricing and game system can be
analyzed under time delays, which often have a nonnegligible
effect.
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APPENDIX
This appendix revisits the analysis in [21], [22] on existence
and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium under Assumptions 1-4.
For games of class G1 and G2, the existence of NE
follows immediately from a standard theorem of game theory
(Theorem 4.4, p.176, in [1]) under Assumptions 1 and 2.
In view of Assumption 4, the Lagrangian function for player
i in this game is given by
Li(x, µ) = Ji(x) +
r∑
j=1
µi,jhj(x), (43)
where µi,j ≥ 0, j = 1, 2, . . . r are the Lagrange multipliers
of player i [33, p. 278]. We now provide a proposition
for G2 games with conditions similar to the well known
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions (Proposition 3.3.1,
p. 310, [33]).
Proposition 1. Let x∗ be a NE point of a G2 game and As-
sumptions 1-4 hold. There exists then a unique set of Lagrange
multipliers, {φi,j : j = 1, 2, . . . r, i = 1, 2, . . . N}, such that
dL(x∗, φ)
dxi
=
dJi(x
∗)
dxi
+
r∑
j=1
φ∗i,j
dhj(x
∗)
dxi
= 0,
i = 1, 2, . . . N,
φi,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j, and φi,j = 0, ∀j /∈ Ai(x∗), ∀i ,
where Ai(x∗) is the set of active constraints in ith player’s
minimization problem at NE point x∗.
Proof: The proof essentially follows lines similar to the
ones of the Proposition 3.3.1 of [33], where the penalty
approach is used to approximate the original constrained
problem by an unconstrained problem that involves a violation
of the constraints. The main difference here is the repetition
of this process for each individual xi at the NE point x∗.
Define now a more compact notation the vector of La-
grangian functions as L := [L1, . . . , LN ], and the N × N
diagonal matrix of Lagrange multipliers for the jth constraint
as Φj = diag[φ1,j, φ2,j, . . . φN,j].
By Proposition 1 and Assumption 4, a NE point x(1)
satisfies
∇L(x(1),Φ(1)) = q(x(1)) +
r∑
j=1
Φ
(1)
j ∇hj(x
(1)) = 0, (44)
where Φ(1)j ≥ 0 is unique for each j. Assume there are two
different NE points x(0) and x(1). Then, one can also write the
counterpart of (44) for x(0). Following an argument similar to
the one in the proof of Theorem 2 in [21], one can show that
this leads to a contradiction. We present a brief outline of a
simplified version of that proof for the sake of completeness.
Multiplying (44) and its counterpart for x(0) from left by
(x(0) − x(1))T , and then adding them together, we obtain
0 = (x(0) − x(1))T∇L(x(1),Φ(1))
+
(
∇L(x(1),Φ(1))
)T
(x(0) − x(1))
+(x(1) − x(0))T∇L(x(0),Φ(0))
= (x(0) − x(1))T
(
q(x(1))− q(x(0))
)
+
(
q(x(1))− q(x(0))
)T
(x(0) − x(1))
+(x(1) − x(0))T
∑r
j=1[Φ
(1)
j ∇hj(x
(1))
−Φ
(0)
j ∇hj(x
(0))].
(45)
Define the strategy vector x(θ) as a convex combination of
the two equilibrium points x(0) , x(1) :
x(θ) = θx(1) + (1 − θ)x(0),
where 0 < θ < 1. Take the derivative of q(x(θ)) with respect
to θ,
dq(x(θ))
dθ
= Q(x(θ))
dx(θ)
dθ
= Q(x(θ))(x(1) − x(0)), (46)
where Q(x) is defined in (5). Integrating (46) over θ yields
q(x(1))− q(x(0)) =
[∫ 1
0
Q(x(θ))dθ
]
(x(1) − x(0)). (47)
Multiplying (47) from left by (x(1)− x(0))T , the transpose of
(47) from right by (x(1) − x(0)), and adding these two terms
yields
(x(1) − x(0))T
[∫ 1
0
Q(x(θ)) +QT (x(θ))dθ
]
(x(1) − x(0)).
(48)
Since Q(x(θ))+QT (x(θ)) is positive definite by Assumption 3
and the sum of two positive definite matrices is positive
definite, the matrix Q¯ :=
∫ 1
0
Q(x(θ))+QT (x(θ))dθ is positive
definite.
Similarly, we have
d∇h(x(θ))
dθ
= H(x(θ))
dx(θ)
dθ
= H(x(θ))(x1 − x0), (49)
where H(x) is the Jacobian of ∇h(x) and positive definite
due to convexity of h(x) by definition. The third term in (45)
(x(0) − x(1))T
∑r
j=1[Φ
(0)
j ∇hj(x
(0))− Φ
(1)
j ∇hj(x
(1))],
is less than
r∑
j=1
[Φ
(1)
j − Φ
(0)
j ][hj(x
(1))− hj(x
(0))],
due to convexity of h(x). Since for each constraint j, hj(x) ≤
0 ∀x, Φ
(i)
j hj(x
(i)) = 0, i = 0, 1, and Φj is positive
definite, where the latter two follow from Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
conditions, this term is also non-positive.
The sum of the first two terms in (45) are the negative of
(48), which is strictly positive for all x(1) 6= x(0). Hence,
(45) is strictly negative which leads to a contradiction unless
x(1) = x(0). Thus, there exists a unique NE point in the class
of games G2.
REFERENCES
[1] T. Bas¸ar and G. J. Olsder, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory,
Philadelphia, PA: SIAM, 2nd edition, 1999.
[2] R. Srikant, The Mathematics of Internet Congestion Control, Systems
& Control: Foundations & Applications. Birkhauser, Boston, MA, 2004.
[3] R. Johari, S. Mannor, and J.N. Tsitsiklis, “Efficiency loss in a network
resource allocation game: the case of elastic supply,” IEEE Trans. on
Automatic Control, vol. 50, no. 11, pp. 1712–1724, November 2005.
[4] B. Hajek and S. Yang, “Strategic buyers in a sum bid game for flat
networks,” IMA Workshop: Control and Pricing in Communication and
Power Networks, March 2004.
[5] S. Robinson, “The price of anarchy,” SIAM News, vol. 37, no. 5, pp.
1–4, June 2004.
[6] C.U. Saraydar, N.B. Mandayam, and D.J. Goodman, “Power control
via pricing in wireless data networks,” IEEE Trans. on Communication,
vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 291 – 303, February 2002.
[7] C. U. Saraydar, N.B. Mandayam, and D. Goodman, “Pricing and power
control in a multicell wireless data network,” IEEE JSAC, vol. 19, no.
10, pp. 1883–1892, October 2001.
[8] M. Cesana, N. Gatti, and I. Malanchini, “A game-theoretic approach to
decentralized optimal power allocation for cellular networks,” in Proc.
of 2nd Intl Workshop on Game Theory in Communication Networks,
Athens, Greece, October 2008.
[9] Q. Zhu and L. Pavel, “State-space approach to pricing design in OSNR
game,” in Proc. of 17th IFAC World Congress, Seoul, Korea, July 2008.
[10] R. Johari and J. N. Tsitsiklis, “Efficiency of scalar-parameterized
mechanisms,” Operations Research, vol. 57, no. 4, pp. 823–839, July
2009.
[11] S. Yang and B. Hajek, “VCG-Kelly mechanisms for allocation of di-
visible goods: Adapting VCG mechanisms to one-dimensional signals,”
IEEE JSAC, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 1237–1243, August 2007.
[12] F. Kelly, A. Maulloo, and D. Tan, “Rate control in communication
networks: Shadow prices, proportional fairness and stability,” Journal
of the Operational Research Society, vol. 49, pp. 237–252, 1998.
[13] T. Bas¸ar, “Stochastic multi-criteria decision problems with multi levels
of hierarchy,” IEEE Trans. on Automatic Control, vol. 26, no. 2, pp.
549–553, April 1981.
[14] T. Bas¸ar, “Stochastic incentive problems with partial dynamic informa-
tion and multiple levels of hierarchy,” European Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 5, no. 2-3, pp. 203–217, 1989.
[15] E. Maskin, “Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality,” Review of
Economic Studies, vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 23 – 38, December 2003.
[16] T. Alpcan, T. Bas¸ar, and S. Dey, “A power control game based on
outage probabilities for multicell wireless data networks,” IEEE Trans.
on Wireless Communications, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 890–899, April 2006.
[17] Y. Pan, T. Alpcan, and L. Pavel, “A distributed optimization approach
to constrained OSNR problem,” in Proc. of 17th IFAC World Congress,
Seoul, Korea, July 2008.
[18] T. Alpcan and T. Bas¸ar, “A game theoretic analysis of intrusion detection
in access control systems,” in Proc. of the 43rd IEEE Conference on
Decision and Control, Paradise Island, Bahamas, December 2004, pp.
1568–1573.
[19] L. Pavel, “A noncooperative game approach to OSNR optimization in
optical networks’,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 51,
no. 5, pp. 848–852, May 2006.
[20] Y. Pan and L. Pavel, “Games with coupled propagated constraints
in optical networks: the multi-link case,” in Proc. of the 46th IEEE
Conference on Decision and Control, New Orleans, USA, December
2007, pp. 3443–3449.
[21] J. B. Rosen, “Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for
concave n-person games,” Econometrica, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 520–534,
July 1965.
[22] T. Alpcan, Noncooperative Games for Control of Networked Systems,
Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL,
May 2006.
[23] T. Alpcan and T. Bas¸ar, “Global stability analysis of an end-to-end
congestion control scheme for general topology networks with delay,”
Elektrik, the Turkish Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer
Sciences, Tubitak, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 139–150, November 2004.
[24] R. K. P. Zia, E. F. Redish, and S. R. McKay, “Making sense of the
legendre transform,” 2008.
[25] R. T. Maheswaran and T. Basar, “Social welfare of selfish agents:
motivating efficiency for divisible resources,” in 43rd IEEE Conf.
on Decision and Control (CDC), Paradise Island, Bahamas, December
2004, vol. 2, pp. 1550– 1555.
[26] T. Alpcan, T. Bas¸ar, R. Srikant, and E. Altman, “CDMA uplink power
control as a noncooperative game,” Wireless Networks, vol. 8, no. 6, pp.
659–670, November 2002.
[27] T. Alpcan, X. Fan, T. Bas¸ar, M. Arcak, and J. T. Wen, “Power control
for multicell CDMA wireless networks: A team optimization approach,”
Wireless Networks, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 647–657, October 2008.
[28] A. Isidori, Nonlinear Control Systems, Springer, 3rd edition, August
1995.
[29] T. Alpcan and L. Pavel, “Nash equilibrium design and optimization,”
in Proc. of Intl. Conf. on Game Theory for Networks (GameNets 2009),
Istanbul, Turkey, May 2009.
[30] H. Khalil, Nonlinear Systems, Prentice Hall, 3rd edition, 2002.
[31] S. M. Kay, Fundamentals of Statistical Signal Processing: Estimation
Theory, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1993.
[32] T. Alpcan, L. Pavel, and N. Stefanovic, “A control theoretic approach to
noncooperative game design,” in Proc. of 48th IEEE Conf. on Decision
and Control, Shanghai, China, December 2009.
[33] D. Bertsekas, Nonlinear Programming, Athena Scientific, Belmont,
MA, 2nd edition, 1999.
